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Abstract—We present statistical screening of test vectors for
detecting a Trojan, malicious circuitry hidden inside an integrated
circuit (IC). When applied a test vector, a Trojan-embedded chip
draws extra leakage current that is unfortunately too small for
the detector in most cases and concealed by process variation
related to chip fabrication. To remedy the problem, we formulate
a statistical approach that can screen and select test vectors in
detecting Trojans. We validate our approach analytically and
with gate-level simulations and show that our screening method
leads to a substantial reduction in false positives and false
negatives when detecting IC Trojans of various sizes.
I. INTRODUCTION
IC Trojan detection is a challenging task. A natural strategy
for detecting extra circuitry is to examine the measured, static
power consumption under the circuit’s input combinations
called test vectors. If a sufficient number of test vectors reveal
the power measurement above what is expected from a Trojan-
free circuit, then the circuit is declared Trojan-embedded. A
class of techniques using such detection strategy is known as
side-channel analysis [1].
While it may appear conceptually simple, the implementa-
tion of side-channel power analysis is challenging for several
reasons. First of all, IC Trojans are presumably small circuits.
Thus their power consumption is also small and can be com-
pletely hidden in normal variance. Secondly, process variations
are introduced at chip fabrication time. Leakage current—the
term we will use equivalently with (leakage) power, or power
consumption, throughout the paper—for the same gate drawn
under the same test vector varies depending on where the
gate is on the chip, the chip in a die, the die on a wafer,
and the wafer in a lot, as well as environmental factors such
as variations in temperature and power sources. Lastly, test
vectors drive a different set of gates in a chip to higher power
consuming states. This means power consumption of the chip
will be test vector dependent, and so will the expected power
consumption of a Trojan-free chip and the threshold power
consumption for the detection be.
For these reasons, IC Trojan detection is considered a
hard problem that needs to cope with various statistical un-
certainties. A Trojan-embedded circuit, for example, could
sometimes consume less power—not more—than the original
circuit without the Trojan under certain test vectors and chips.
It is therefore necessary to address the process and test vector-
induced variations, which call for statistical robustness in
detection methods.
In this paper we focus on statistical screening of test
vectors that reduces false positives and false negatives in an
IC Trojan detection scheme based on leakage current side-
channel analysis. We describe our detection methodology and
explain how false positive and negative rates are calculated
in Section II. Section III presents our method for screening
test vectors and explains the underlying idea. In Section IV,
we empirically validate our approach and discuss the key
results. We describe related work in Section V, and Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. MULTI-CHIP TROJAN DETECTION PROCEDURE
Suppose that we are given a number of test chips embody-
ing the same circuit-under-test (CUT). Our Trojan detection
procedure consists of three tasks: (1) conduct single-chip test
for all test chips and declare findings for each chip; (2)
analyze the probabilities of false positive and false negative
declarations in the preceding task; and (3) draw a statistical
conclusion suggesting whether the CUT is Trojan-free or
Trojan-embedded.
Task 1. Conduct single-chip test on multiple chips. For each
test chip, we apply all test vectors1 to the CUT on the chip as
input vectors of the circuit. For each test vector, we measure
empirical power consumption (pw) and record its ideal (or
gold) power consumption (g) defined as the sum of mean
power consumptions of all gates at their respective states
driven by the test vector.
We make the following declarations about the Trojan pres-
ence on the chip:
• Positive if pw > g + u for at least L% of test vectors
• Negative if pw < g + v for at least L% of test vectors
• Inconclusive otherwise
where u and v are certain thresholds with 0 < v ≤ u and
L > 50. We choose u and v around the expected power
consumption of Trojan.
Task 2. Analyze probabilities of false positive and false
negative declarations. A positive declaration resulted from
pw > g+u in Task 1 for required L% of test vectors is false if
the CUT turns out to be Trojan-free. This is known as a false
positive declaration. Note that under the same test vector, the
leakage power consumed by a Trojan-free CUT may vary from
chip to chip due to process variation. Fig. 1(a) illustrates the
probability density function (PDF) of this power consumption.
Fig. 1(b) depicts the corresponding PDF of a Trojan-embedded
CUT under the same test vector. The second PDF is essentially
the first PDF shifted to right by the expected leakage power
drawn by the Trojan under the test vector. We note the use
of Gaussian-like PDFs for convenience. They actually provide
a reasonably accurate approximation in real-world scenarios
when the number of gates turned on by the test vector is
1Applying all possible test vectors, however, is not feasible for some circuits
whose input space is too large, e.g., CPUs. For such cases, we assume that a
reasonably sized (and properly selected) subset of test vectors is available.
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Fig. 1. Probability density function for (a) Trojan-free and (b) Trojan-
embedded CUT under a test vector
large. The probability of false positive declaration is the area
highlighted in green along the right tail of the PDF in Fig. 1(a).
Similarly, the probability of false negative declaration is the
area colored in blue from Fig. 1(b).
Task 3. Infer statistical conclusion on whether or not Trojan
is present based on test results from multiple chips. After
completing all single-chip tests on Q test chips, we can
determine the likelihood of Trojan presence based on the
outcome. Following a classical hypothesis testing framework,
we formulate our null hypothesis H0 as “the CUT is Trojan-
free.” Suppose ρ out of Q chips have been declared positive.
Then assuming H0 is true, we can compute the probability of
this outcome as follows:
Probability of ρ chips declared positive
= Pr{Exactly ρ chips with pw > g + u}
=
(
Q
ρ
)
pρ(1− p)Q−ρ
where p is the probability of a false positive declaration defined
in Task 2. (p can be empirically determined from statistics on
the findings of Task 1.) For example, consider Q = 10 and
p = 0.1 with observed ρ = 5. The above expression yields a
probability of 0.0015, which is assumed to be smaller than the
threshold we set for hypothesis testing. Thus we reject H0 and
conclude that the CUT is more likely Trojan-embedded (with
a false positive rate of 0.0015). We can similarly derive the
false negative rate based on the number of chips that receive
a negative declaration.
III. STATISTICAL SCREENING OF TEST VECTORS TO
REDUCE FALSE DETECTION
To lower process variation induced false positive and nega-
tive rates, we use test vectors screening to select those which
will lead to reduced tail size of the PDFs in Fig. 1. Intuitively
speaking, a decrease of the tail size on the right side of the
PDF will reduce false positive declarations. That is, the PDF
under each test vector survived from screening will exhibit
a smaller variance. On the other hand, a decrease of the tail
size on the left side will reduce false negative declarations.
A successful screening will transform the PDFs of Fig. 1 to
look like the PDFs in Fig. 2. Observing these principles, we
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Fig. 2. Probability density function for (a) Trojan-free and (b) Trojan-
embedded CUTs under a screened test vector
specify our method for statistical screening of test vectors for
a given test chip:
(a) Apply all test vectors and measure their leakage currents;
(b) Organize test vectors into W groups of N randomly
shuffled test vectors;
(c) For each group, sort test vectors into b bins according to
the measured leakage current;
(d) For each bin, fit the leakage current distribution of test
vectors into a Gaussian PDF, obtain parameters µfitted
and σfitted, and filter out those test vectors whose mea-
sured leakage current is less than µfitted−α ·σfitted and
greater than µfitted + β · σfitted.
The bins in Step (c) are centered around b equally spaced
leakage current values—note this will in general result in dif-
ferent number of test vectors per each bin. Step (c) also assures
that test vectors in the same bin will have similar g, the gold
leakage current response. We will carry out Step (d) only for
those bins that have sufficiently many test vectors (e.g., > 100)
to allow meaningful statistical screening. After the screening
of Step (d), for remaining test vectors the power consumption
will likely exhibit smaller gaps between the idealistic g and
the empirical leakage current (a pw equivalent). For example,
we have noticed from our test circuits of Section IV.B that
the screening procedure reduces the maximum gap across all
test vectors up to 65 nA in leakage current. Subsequently,
power consumption of the CUT under these test vectors will
have smaller variances, thus more effective to bring out the
subtle contribution from small Trojan circuitry. Furthermore,
by filtering out the test vectors with relatively low power
consumption in Step (d), we assure that the remainders will
turn on sufficient gates to allow more stable statistics.
It is important to note that the screening of Step (d) follows
asymmetric filtering—that is, we cut the left tail using smaller
filtering parameter α than β for the right tail (e.g., α = 1
and β = 2). We make the usual assumption that the leakage
current (or power) distribution of logic gates is best modeled
using the log-normal distribution [2]. Thus, the leakage current
distribution of the test chip should follow the sum of log-
normal random variables. The left side of a log-normal PDF
has a steep, short tail while its right side has a heavy tail,
which explains our asymmetric filtering.
TABLE I
LOG-NORMAL PARAMETERS FOR A 2-INPUT NAND GATE
Input (state) µ (nA) σ (nA)
00 .223 .082
01 or 10 4.578 3.026
11 13.109 16.785
Double-C17 (from ISCAS-85 Benchmark) 
i0 
i1 
i2 
i3 
i4 
i8 
i9 
i10 
i11 
i12 
i5 
i6 
i13 
i14 
i7 
i15 
o0 
o1 
o2 
o3 
Fig. 3. double-c17 combines two ISCAS-85 c17s.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our empirical validation features a benchmark circuit of 100
NAND gates with which we simulated the chip leakage current
under all possible combinations of test vector inputs. We wrote
custom C code that propagates precise, internal logic states of
all gates in the benchmark circuit and followed a log-normal
leakage current model for each gate. This section explains our
experimental methodology and discusses empirical results.
A. Simulating Log-normal Leakage Current Distribution
The physical variations in a circuit, which are normally
distributed, have an exponential effect on current. This is why
the log-normal distribution serves a good approximation for
leakage current. To measure the total power consumption of
a circuit, we must first know an input combination to each
gate (i.e., gate state), which is driven by a test vector applied
at the circuit input. Our simulator propagates logic states of
all gates and determines the total leakage current by summing
individual gate’s leakage contribution. Table I [3] summarizes
the log-normal parameters to estimate leakage current for a
2-input NAND gate fabricated under an arbitrary process.
B. Benchmark Circuit
We adopted circuit c17 from the ISCAS-85 benchmark
suite [4] as a building block. The original c17 consists of
6 NAND gates. We combined two c17 blocks to create
double-c17, which contains 20 NAND gates as depicted in
Fig. 3. Lastly, we use five double-c17 blocks to produce
our benchmark circuit, namely double-c17x5 as shown in
Fig. 4. The double-c17x5 benchmark has 16 input pins,
which yields a test vector space of size 216.
C. Generating Clean and Trojan-embedded Test Chips
We generated 10 unmodified double-c17x5 chips repre-
senting Trojan-free CUTs. They are generated independently
and randomly using the log-normal parameters of Table I such
that the same gates in the CUT (locality) among different chips
induce different leakage currents.
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Fig. 4. 100-NAND gate double-c17x5 benchmark circuit used for
evaluation.
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Fig. 5. Effects of test vectors screening in reducing the number of false
positive or inconclusive declarations among 10 chips
We generated five different IC Trojans of sizes 1 to 5 NAND
gates, namely trojan-1 to trojan-5 (i.e., our smallest
Trojan is a single NAND gate). Next, we inserted each Trojan
(trojan-i) to a clean double-c17x5 at its upper middle
double-c17 block. We instantiated 10 chips for each Trojan
(totaling 50 altogether). Finally, we ran logic simulations for
the clean and Trojan circuits to acquire the leakage current
measurements.
D. Evaluation Scenarios
We have the following evaluation scenarios.
1) Scenario 1 – false positives: we run the Trojan detection
procedure on the 10 Trojan-free chips to determine the number
of chips that are declared positive (i.e., these are false positive
declarations), using unscreened and screened test vectors. We
expect the number of false positives to be smaller with the
screened test vectors.
2) Scenario 2 – false negatives: we run the Trojan detection
procedure on the 50 Trojan-embedded chips and determine
the number of chips that are declared negative (i.e., these are
false negative declarations). Note that trojan-1 would be
more difficult to detect. Again, we expect the number of false
negative declarations to be smaller with our screening method.
E. Results and Discussion
Fig. 5 presents the number of false positive and inconclu-
sive declarations. We applied the detection threshold g + u
with variable u ∈ {σ, 1.1σ, 1.2σ, 1.3σ, 1.4σ, 1.5σ}2. From the
threshold set at g+1.2σ, our screening method could achieve
both zero false positive and zero inconclusive. In contrast,
2We determine σ using Fernandes and Vemuri’s method [2] that estimates
the sum of log-normals with the parameters from Table I.
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Fig. 6. False negative declarations among ten chips for unscreened test
vectors
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Fig. 7. Improved false negative declarations among ten chips with statistical
screening
for the unscreened test vectors none of our test setting could
achieve zero false positive declaration.
Figs. 6 and 7 depict false negative declarations for un-
screened and screened test vectors. As with the scenario for
false positive declarations, we used the same values for v
ranging from σ to 1.5σ to set detection thresholds. While
false negatives for smaller Trojan sizes of 1, 2, or 3 NAND
gates (i.e., only 1–3% the size of the benchmark circuit)
could not be eliminated completely, our test vector screening
significantly outperformed unscreened test vectors, resulting a
60–85% reduction in false negative detection.
An increase in detection threshold causes the number of
false positive declarations to drop. This holds true for both
unscreened and screened test vectors as the threshold moves
along the right side of the Trojan-free PDF eventually reducing
the area underneath the curve to zero thereby incurring no
false positives. As illustrated in Fig. 2, screening removes false
positives more effectively by reducing the tail size. A similar
explanation can be made for the case of false negative along
the left side of the Trojan-embedded PDF curve. We point
out that the superior performance of the screened method is
largely due to the use of asymmetric screening with α = 1
and β = 2 as discussed in Section III.
The last step for Trojan detection is to set up the hypothesis
testing described in Section II. From Scenario 1 with the
single-chip threshold g+1.2σ, we found that p < 0.01 with our
screening method and p = 0.44 for unscreened test vectors.
Using a set of Q = 10 chips, the observed ρ = 0 for screened
test vectors yielded 0.951, and ρ = 6 for unscreened test
vectors yielded 0.26 false positive rates. Despite the large
ρ value of 6, unscreened test vectors resulted an indecisive,
mediocre probability 0.26, which is not high enough to make
H0 stand true with confidence. On the other hand, if we decide
to reject H0, then we would have an incorrect conclusion of the
CUT being Trojan-embedded with a high 0.26 false positive
rate. Either conclusion is unsatisfactory. In contrast, tests of
Task 1 under our screening method would result ρ = 0 with
high probability of 0.951. This makes H0 stand true with high
confidence and conclude the CUT Trojan-free, which is indeed
correct for this set of chips.
V. RELATED WORK
Side-channel analysis for IC Trojan detection has been
discussed popularly at major security and circuit conferences.
We stress that our work here is not about inventing a new side-
channel analysis scheme, but about improving the performance
of side-channel techniques by reducing statistical uncertainty
surrounded test vector measurements. Thus, existing tech-
niques such as IC Fingerprinting [1], GLC [5], and DISTROY
[3] can embrace our method and benefit from it.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Trojan detection is fundamentally a statistical procedure to
remove uncertainties of process variations that make a hard
problem for side-channel analysis. In response to this problem,
we have introduced a novel statistical screening method for
selecting the test vectors that help substantially reduce false
positives and false negatives in detecting IC Trojans. In addi-
tion, we have proposed a multi-chip detection procedure that
provides a general framework for statistical detection methods.
With gate-level simulations, we have shown that the proposed
method should work for practical circuits. Test vector screen-
ing can potentially benefit a variety of IC Trojan detection
approaches such as compressive sensing based detection [3].
In future work, we plan to explore links to those approaches.
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